Panel: Discrimination and Harassment Issues in Higher Education - Recent Tenure Discrimination Federal Court Decisions by Rossein, Merrick
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy
Volume 0 National Center Proceedings 2016 Article 64
September 2016
Panel: Discrimination and Harassment Issues in
Higher Education - Recent Tenure Discrimination
Federal Court Decisions
Merrick Rossein
City University of New York
Follow this and additional works at: http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba
Part of the Collective Bargaining Commons, and the Higher Education Commons
This Proceedings Material is brought to you for free and open access by The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Collective Bargaining
in the Academy by an authorized editor of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rossein, Merrick (2016) "Panel: Discrimination and Harassment Issues in Higher Education - Recent Tenure Discrimination Federal




Merrick	T.	Rossein		Yul	Chu	v.		Mississippi	State	University,	592	F.	App’x	260	(5th	Cir.	2014)		Plaintiff,	an	Asian	male	(native	of	South	Korea)	was	denied	tenure	at	a	state	university	and	brought	suit	claiming	racial	discrimination.	The	Fifth	Circuit	noted:		 	University	tenure	decisions	represent	a	distinct	kind	of	employment	action,	involving	special	considerations.	 	 In	order	to	establish	a	prima	facie	case	 in	the	context	of	a	denial	of	tenure,	the	plaintiff	must	show	that:	(1)	he	belongs	to	a	protected	group,	(2)	he	was	qualified	for	tenure,	and	(3)	he	was	denied	tenure	in	circumstances	permitting	an	inference	of	discrimination.		Evidence	that	 supports	 a	 prima	 facie	 case	 includes	 departures	 from	 university	procedures,	conventional	evidence	of	bias	against	he	plaintiff,	and	evidence	that	 the	 plaintiff	 is	 found	 to	 be	 qualified	 for	 tenure	 by	 some	 significant	portion	 of	 the	 department	 faculty,	 reference,	 or	 other	 scholars	 in	 the	particular	field.	Id.	at	265.			The	 plaintiff	 proffered	 as	 direct	 evidence	 testimony	 that	 members	 of	 his	 department	mocked	 his	 accent	 at	 different	 times.	 The	 Fifth	 Circuit	 ruled	 that	 the	 standard	 for	workplace	 comments	 in	 order	 to	 amount	 to	 “direct	 evidence”	 of	 discrimination,	 the	comments	“…	must	be	(1)	related	to	the	plaintiff’s	protected	status;	(2)	proximate	in	time	to	 the	 adverse	 employment	 action;	 (3)	 made	 by	 an	 individual	 with	 authority	 over	 the	employment	decision	at	issue;	and	(4)	related	to	the	employment	decision	at	issue.”		Id.	at	264;	see	Brown	v.	CSC	Logic,	Inc.,	82	F.3d	651,	655	(5th	Cir.	1996).				Here,	 the	 comments	were	made	 in	2002-2003	and	 so	 the	 court	 concluded	 that	 since	 the	plaintiff	 did	 not	 apply	 for	 tenure	 until	 2006,	 the	 court	 concluded,	 “that	 such	 temporal	distance	 attenuates	 the	 connection	 between	 the	 actions	 and	 the	 tenure	 decision.”	 592	 F.	App’x	 at	 264.	 	 Further,	 the	 court	 dismissed	 the	 comments	 as	 direct	 evidence	 of	discrimination	 as	 the	 comments	were	 not	made	 by	 “individuals	 with	 authority	 over	 the	tenure	decision.	 	Though	it	 is	true	that	members	of	his	department	sat	on	one	committee	that	made	a	recommendation	on	tenure,	the	tenure-approval	process	consisted	of	multiple	levels	of	review	and	avenues	for	appeal.	The	faculty	members	alleged	to	have	made	these	comments	did	not	make	the	final	decision	as	to	plaintiff’s	tenure,	and	any	influence	over	the	decision	was	limited	by	the	committee	and	review	structures.		Finally,	the	alleged	jokes	and	comments	about	his	accent	were	not	related	to	the	tenure	decision	at	issue,	so	they	are	not	direct	evidence	of	discrimination.”	Id.			The	 Fifth	 Circuit	 found:	 “At	 every	 level,	 those	 who	 reviewed	 plaintiff’s	 application	recommended	 against	 granting	 tenure,	 finding	 that	 he	 had	 failed	 to	 complete	 sufficient	
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research	as	a	professor.	In	reaching	that	conclusion,	the	decision	makers	looked	a		number	of	 factors	 relating	 to	 research,	 including	 the	 number	 of	 articles	 plaintiff	 published,	 the	quality	and	prestige	of	the	publishing	journals,	and	the	amount	of	outside	research	funding	he	 secured.”	 Id.	 at	 265	 Plaintiff	 failed	 to	 publish	 any	 articles	 during	 his	 first	 five	 ears	 at	MSU.	 When	 he	 applied	 to	 for	 tenure,	 he	 had	 published	 only	 three,	 with	 several	 others	accepted	 for	 publication,	 but	 the	 publishing	 journals	 were	 not	 highly	 regarded.	 Finally,	plaintiff	had	secured	only	$26,000	in	research	funding,	which	was	far	below	average	for	his	department.	 	Moreover,	 those	 deficiencies	 in	 plaintiff’s	 research	were	 pointed	 out	 in	 his	annual	 performance	 reviews.	 Based	 on	 this	 and	 other	 evidence,	 the	 tenure	 reviewers	determined	 that	plaintiff	 did	not	meet	 the	 research	 requirements	 for	 tenure	 and	did	not	excel	in	any	of	the	three	(aforementioned)	relevant	areas.	Id.			Thrash	v.	Miami	University,	549	F.	App’x	511	(6th	Cir.	2014)	cert.	denied,	135	S.	Ct.	245,	190	L.	Ed.	2d	136	(2014).		In	2004,	a	search	committee	conducted	a	search	to	fill	a	single,	open	tenure-track	position	in	 the	 University's	 Department	 of	 Paper	 Science	 and	 Engineering	 (the	Department).	 The	committee's	 list	 of	 finalists	 for	 the	 position	 included	 Dr.	 Thrash	 and	 Dr.	 Lei	 Kerr.	 The	committee	 recommended	 Dr.	 Kerr	 as	 its	 first	 choice,	 while	 also	 recommending	 that	 the	University	 bring	 Dr.	 Thrash	 into	 the	 Department	 as	 a	 tenure-track	 “opportunity	 hire.”	According	to	Dr.	Marek	Dollar,	Dean	of	the	School	of	Engineering	and	Applied	Sciences,	an	“opportunity	hire”	was	a	hire	made	pursuant	 to	 an	 “informal	policy”	 at	 the	University	of	obtaining	 funding	 to	hire	 candidates	who	were	under-represented	minorities	 even	 if	 the	University	did	not	have	a	position	open.	Id.	at	513.		When	a	tenure-track	instructor	is	hired,	he	or	she	is	placed	on	a	multi-year	“probationary	period”	during	which	time	he	or	she	is	evaluated	yearly	using	the	four	tenure	criteria.	Each	year,	the	department-level	promotion	and	tenure	(P	&	T)	committee,	the	department	chair,	and	 the	 division	 dean	 evaluate	 the	 candidate.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 department-level	 P	 &	 T	committee	consisted	of	three	tenured	faculty	members	from	the	Department,	and	did	not	include	Dr.	Lalvani.	Id.	 	Dr.	Thrash's	first	four-year	reviews	noted	that	he	was	deficient	in	the	area	of	research.	Dr.	Thrash's	fourth-year	reviews	were	more	direct.	The	department-level	 P	 &	 T	 committee	 found	 that,	 although	Dr.	 Thrash	 excelled	 at	 teaching,	 [t]he	 P	&	 T	guidelines	require	that	you	establish	a	record	of	high-quality	publications	at	Miami.	In	the	judgment	 of	 the	 committee	 this	 has	 not	 been	 done	 yet	 ....	 Your	 final	 dossier	 should	demonstrate	 growth	 in	 scholarship	 over	 your	 first	 five	 years	 at	Miami	 to	 show	 that	 you	have	established	a	record	of	high-	quality	publications	and	a	viable	research	program.	Dr.	Thrash's	fifth-year	reviews	were	more	positive.	The	department-level	P	&	T	committee,	Dr.	Lalvani,	and	Dean	Dollar	all	noted	that	 in	 the	previous	year,	Dr.	Thrash	had	three	papers	accepted	for	publication	in	peer-reviewed	journals.	However,	the	committee	also	continued	to	 “recommend[	 ]	 that	 you	 further	 strengthen	 your	 research	 agenda	 in	 your	 [P	 &	 T]	dossier.”	 Similarly,	Dean	Dollar's	 fifth-year	 review	praised	Dr.	 Thrash's	 improvements	 in	securing	publications,	but	 stressed	 “the	need	 to	demonstrate	prospective	 continuation	of	his	research	in	the	years	to	come.”	Provost	Herbst	commended	Dr.	Thrash	on	his	increased	publications,	 but	 added	 that	 it	 was	 still	 “essential	 that	 you	 indicate	 the	 nature	 of	 your	contribution	on	multi-authored	publications.”	Id.	at	514-15.			
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	The	court	goes	through	the	burden	shifting	framework	language	and	noted	that	defendants	proffered	 a	 legitimate,	 nondiscriminatory	 reason	 for	 the	 decision	 to	 not	 extend	 a	 tenure	offer	 to	 Dr.	 Thrash,	 namely,	 that	 his	 scholarship	 and	 research	 record	was	 insufficient	 to	warrant	tenure.	Id.	at	518.		Thrash	 argued	 that	 the	 decision	not	 to	 offer	 him	 tenure	was	pretextual	 because	 there	 is	evidence	that	Dr.	Lalvani	(superior)	“devalued	African-American	scholars	generally.”	 	The	court	declines	to	agree	with	argument	citing	to	the	record	that	he	was	in	fact	hired	by	the	department	 as	 a	 viable	 candidate,	 indicating	 he	 was	 qualified,	 and	 Dr.	 Lalvani	“enthusiastically	recommended	that	Dr.	Thrash	be	hired.”	The	court	said	that	 it	could	not	conclude	“merely	 from	the	 fact	 that	Dr.	Thrash	was	hired	as	an	opportunity	hire	 that	Dr.	Lalvani	harbored	a	negative	view	of	either	African-American	scholarship	or	Dr.	Thrash.”	Id.	at	519.		Plaintiff	 further	 argued	 as	 an	 example	 of	 pretext,	 that	 the	 fact	 the	 department	 rejected	some	 of	 his	 outside	 references	 from	 historically	 Black	 colleges	 are	 indicative	 of	discrimination.	 	But	the	court	concluded	that	four	of	the	six	reviewers	who	were	selected	for	the	final	review	of	his	application	were	African-American	,	including	three	suggested	by	Thrash	and	therefore	this	argument	was	weak.	Id.	at	519.		Finally,	the	court	addressed	plaintiff’s	pretextual	argument	that	he	was	qualified	for	tenure.		The	 court	 specifically	 notes	 that	 it	 approached	 this	 argument	 “cautiously	 as	 it	 is	 not	 the	function	 of	 the	 courts	 to	 sit	 as	 super-tenure	 committees.”	 Id.	 at	 521.	 Further,	 the	 Sixth	Circuit	noted:		 	To	 the	 extent	 that,	 as	 here,	 a	 plaintiff’s	 pretext	 argument	 would	 require	courts	 to	 perform	 a	 substantive	 evaluation	 of	 his	 or	 her	 own	 academic	record,	the	courts	face	a	significant	challenge.	We	are	neither	engineers	nor	scientists,	 and	 as	 such	 are	 ill-suited	 to	 evaluate	 the	 quality	 of	 Dr.	 Thrash’s	work	 ourselves.	 	 To	 that	 end,	 this	 court	 has	 previously	 noted	 that	 “tenure	decision	sin	an	academic	setting	involve	a	combination	of	factors	which	tend	to	set	them	apart	from	employment	decisions	generally.”	Id.	at	521.			The	Court	relies	on	the	Seventh	Circuit’s	policy	language	for	guidance:		 	Tenure	 cases	 require	 something	 more	 than	 mere	 qualification;	 the	department	 must	 believe	 the	 candidate	 has	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	promise…Given	 the	 nuanced	 nature	 of	 such	 decisions,	we	 generally	 do	 not	second	guess	the	expert	decisions	of	faculty	committees…Accordingly,	in	the	absence	 of	 clear	 discrimination,	 we	 are	 generally	 reluctant	 to	 review	 the	merits	of	tenure	decisions,	recognizing	that	scholars	are	in	the	best	position	make	 the	 highly	 subjective	 judgments	 related	 to	 the	 review	 of	 scholarship	and	 university	 service.”Id.	 citing	 Adelman-Reyes	 v.	 Saint	 Xavier	 Univ.,	 500	F.3d	662,	667	(7th	Cir.	2007).		
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		 The	court	also	relies	on	similar	Eighth	Circuit	language,	“in	the	tenure	context…the	plaintiff’s	 evidence	 of	 pretext	 must	 be	 of	 such	 strength	 and	 quality	 as	 to	 permit	 a	reasonable	 finding	 that	 the	denial	 of	 tenure	was	obviously	unsupported.”	Thrash	at	521;	Kobrin	v.	Univ.	of	Minnesota,	121	F.3d	408,	414	(8th	Cir.	1997).				 The	court	took	into	account	plaintiff’s	five	plus	years	academic	achievements	while	at	 the	 institution	 and	 concluded	 that	 while	 plaintiff	 performed	 well	 in	 his	 fifth	 year	 by	receiving	high	marks	in	teaching	and	in	service,	his	research	(skill)	was	still	questioned	by	the	committee.	 	Thrash	at	521.	 	Further,	 the	court	used	the	University’s	 tenure	guideline,	that	 it	 looks	 not	 simply	 at	 current	 skill	 and	 research	 acumen	 but	 also	 “prospective	continuation	 of	 high	 quality”	 scholarship,	 that	 plaintiff	 did	 not	meet	 those	 requirements	according	 to	 this	 reviews.	 Id.	 at	 522.	 Further,	 the	 court	 notes	 that	 in	 plaintiff’s	 chosen	outside	 reviewers,	 many	 of	 them	 expressed	 mixed	 views	 about	 the	 quality	 of	 his	scholarship	and	that	therefore,	taking	all	of	the	circumstances	and	facts	into	consideration,	“Dr.	 Thrash’s	 evidence	 of	 pretext	 as	 to	 the	 quality	 of	 his	 scholarship	 was	 not	 of	 such	 a	strength	 and	 quality	 as	 to	 permit	 a	 reasonable	 finding	 that	 the	 denial	 of	 tenure	 was	obviously	unsupported.”’	Id.;	see	Kobrin,	121	F.3d	at	414.		The	 court	 then	 reviews	 plaintiff’s	 arguments	 of	 discrimination	 via	 his	 supervisor,	 Dr.	Lalvani.		The	court	utilizes	the	“cat’s	paw”	theory	of	liability	in	its	decision.		Thrash	at	522.		“The	cat’s	paw	theory	of	liability,	refers	to	a	situation	in	which	a	biased	subordinate,	who	lacks	 decision	making	 power,	 uses	 the	 formal	 decision	maker	 as	 a	 dupe	 in	 a	 deliberate	scheme	to	trigger	a	discriminatory	action.”	Thrash	at	522;	E.E.O.C.	v.	BCI	Coca-Cola	Bottling	Co.	of	Los	Angeles,	450	F.3d	476,	484	(10th	Cir.	2006),	accord	Davis	v.	Omni-Care,	Inc.,	482	F.	 App’x	 102,	 109	 (6th	 Cir.	 2012).	 “In	 cases	 where	 intermediate	 supervisors	 harbor	 an	impermissible	 bias,	 it	 is	 proper	 to	 impute	 their	 discriminatory	 attitudes	 to	 the	 formal	decision	maker	even	if	the	formal	decision	maker	did	not	harbor	such	attitudes.”	Thrash	at	522;	Bryant	v.	Compass	Grp.	USA	Inc.,	413	F.3d	471,	477	(5th	Cir.	2005).						 “If	 a	 supervisor	 performs	 an	 act	 motivated	 by	 animus	 that	 is	 intended	 by	 the	supervisor	to	cause	an	adverse	employment	action,	and	if	that	act	is	a	proximate	cause	of	the	 ultimate	 employment	 action,	 then	 the	 employer	 is	 liable.”	 Thrash	 at	 522;	 Staub	 v.	Proctor	Hosp.,	___U.S.	___,	131	S.Ct.	1186,	1194	(2011).		“With	regard	to	causation,	the	Court	held	 that	 it	 is	common	for	 injuries	 to	have	multiple	proximate	causes,	and,	 therefore,	 the	mere	fact	that	a	decision	maker	conducts	a	post	hoc	investigation	into	its	decision	does	not	per	se	absolve	it	of	liability,	particularly	if	the	investigation	relies	on	facts	provided	by	the	biased	supervisor.”	Thrash	at	522;	Staub	at	1192-93.			 Here,	 the	 plaintiff	 argued	 that	 because	 at	 every	 stage	 of	 his	 tenure	 review,	 Dr.	Lalvani’s	 negative	 tenure	 recommendations	were	 relied	 on	 “to	 some	degree,”	 that	 under	Staub,	he	is	entitled	to	relief.		However,	the	court	makes	very	clear	that	in	order	to	prevail	under	a	cat’s	paw	theory,	Thrash	would	have	had	to	demonstrate	that	Dr.	Lalvani’s	actions	or	negative	comments	were	both	a	proximate	cause	and	the	ultimate	cause	of	the	ultimate	decision	to	deny	him	tenure.	Thrash,	at	523.	The	court	concludes	that	even	if	Thrash	could	
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show	that	Dr.	Lalvani’s	negative	comments	were	a	proximate	cause	of	his	tenure	denial,	the	plaintiff	failed	to	show	that	Dr.	Lalvani’s	actions	were	in	fact	pretextual.	Id.				 Finally,	 the	 court	 concludes	 that	 it	 would	 be	 improper	 to	 “impute	 Dr.	 Lalvani’s	alleged	discriminatory	attitude	to	the	University	where	Dr.	Thrash	has	failed	to	create	a	fact	question	regarding	Dr.	Lalvani’s	discriminatory	attitude	in	the	first	place.	Id.			The	 court	 ruled	 that	 plaintiff	 failed	 to	 prove	 that	 he	 was	 a	 victim	 of	 intentional	discrimination	when	he	was	denied	tenure.	Id.			Blasdel	v.	Nw.	Univ.,	687	F.3d	813	(7th	Cir.	2012)		Judge	Posner	for	the	Seventh	Circuit	emphasized	the	great	difficulty	in	challenging	tenure	denial	noting:		 But	 although	 the	 legal	 standard	 is	 the	 same	 whether	 the	 plaintiff	 in	 an	employment	 discrimination	 case	 is	 a	 salesman	 or	 a	 scientist,	 practical	considerations	 make	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 denial	 of	 tenure	 at	 the	 college	 or	university	 level	 an	 uphill	 fight—notably	 the	 absence	 of	 fixed,	 objective	criteria	for	tenure	at	that	level.	Vanasco	v.	National–Louis	University,	137	F.3d	962,	 968	 (7th	 Cir.1998)	 (“such	 decisions	 necessarily	 rely	 on	 subjective	judgments	 about	 academic	 potential”);	 Namenwirth	 v.	 Board	 of	 Regents	 of	
University	of	Wisconsin	System,	769	F.2d	1235,	1243	(7th	Cir.1985)	(	“tenure	decisions	 have	 always	 relied	 primarily	 on	 judgments	 about	 academic	potential,	and	there	is	no	algorithm	for	producing	those	judgments”);	Fisher	
v.	 *816	Vassar	 College,	 70	 F.3d	 1420,	 1435	 (2d	 Cir.1995)	 (“it	 is	 difficult	 to	conceive	 of	 tenure	 standards	 that	 would	 be	 objective	 and	 quantifiable”),	abrogated	on	other	grounds,	Reeves	v.	Sanderson	Plumbing	Products,	Inc.,	530	U.S.	133,	147–48,	120	S.Ct.	2097,	147	L.Ed.2d	105	(2000);	Zahorik	v.	Cornell	
University,	 729	 F.2d	 85,	 92–93	 (2d	 Cir.1984)	 (“the	 particular	 needs	 of	 the	department	for	specialties,	the	number	of	tenure	positions	available,	and	the	desired	mix	of	well	 known	 scholars	 and	up-and-coming	 faculty	 all	must	be	taken	 into	 account....	 [T]enure	 decisions	 are	 a	 source	 of	 unusually	 great	disagreement....	 [T]he	 stakes	 are	 high,	 the	 number	 of	 relevant	 variables	 is	great	 and	 there	 is	 no	 common	 unit	 of	 measure	 by	 which	 to	 judge	scholarship”).	Id.	at	815-16.			Further,	 Judge	 Posner	 opined	 about	 institutional	 autonomy	 and	 academic	 freedom	 as	 a	caution	to	courts	addressing	discrimination	claims	in	tenure	cases,	stating:		 And	 we	 must	 not	 ignore	 the	 interest	 of	 colleges	 and	 universities	 in	institutional	 autonomy.	Grutter	v.	Bollinger,	 539	U.S.	 306,	 328–30,	 123	S.Ct.	2325,	156	L.Ed.2d	304	(2003);	Regents	of	University	of	Michigan	v.	Ewing,	474	U.S.	214,	225,	106	S.Ct.	507,	88	L.Ed.2d	523	(1985);	Hosty	v.	Carter,	412	F.3d	
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731,	736	(7th	Cir.2005)	(en	banc)	(“academic	freedom	includes	the	authority	of	 the	university	 to	manage	an	academic	 community	 and	evaluate	 teaching	and	 scholarship	 free	 from	 interference	 by	 other	 units	 of	 government,	including	 the	 courts”);	 Piarowski	 v.	 Illinois	 Community	 College	 District	 515,	759	F.2d	625,	629–30	(7th	Cir.1985);	Urofsky	v.	Gilmore,	216	F.3d	401,	412–15	 (4th	 Cir.2000)	 (en	 banc).	 Although	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 in	 University	 of	
Pennsylvania	v.	EEOC,	supra,	493	U.S.	at	195–201,	110	S.Ct.	577,	was	emphatic	that	 academic	 freedom	does	 not	 justify	 immunizing	materials	 submitted	 in	the	tenure	process	from	the	EEOC's	subpoena	power,	courts	tread	cautiously	when	 asked	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	 tenure	 determination	 itself.	 They	must	 be	mindful	that,	as	Judge	Friendly	said	in	Lieberman	v.	Gant,	630	F.2d	60,	67	(2d	Cir.1980),	“to	infer	discrimination	from	a	comparison	among	candidates	is	to	risk	 a	 serious	 infringement	 of	 first	 amendment	 values.	 A	 university's	prerogative	 ‘to	determine	 for	 itself	on	academic	grounds	who	may	teach’	 is	an	important	part	of	our	long	tradition	of	academic	freedom.	Sweezy	v.	New	
Hampshire,	 354	 U.S.	 234,	 263,	 77	 S.Ct.	 1203,	 1	 L.Ed.2d	 1311	 (1957)	(Frankfurter,	 J.,	 joined	 by	 Harlan,	 J.,	 concurring	 in	 the	 result)	 (citations	omitted).”	Id.	at	816.			Judge	 Posner	 also	 explored	 quantity	 and	 quality	 issues	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 tenured	 faculty	makes	it	extremely	difficult	to	terminated	a	professor,	noting:		 A	disappointed	candidate	for	tenure	at	a	college	or	university	may	well	be	the	best	possible	candidate	along	one	dimension	but	not	others.	If	A	publishes	an	excellent	academic	paper	every	five	years	on	average,	is	she	better	or	worse	than	B,	who	publishes	 a	 good	but	not	 excellent	paper	on	average	every	 six	months,	so	that	at	the	end	of	five	years	he	has	published	10	papers	and	she	only	1?	Quantity	and	quality	are	(within	limits)	substitutes.	A	company	that	made	the	finest	automobile	in	the	world,	but	made	only	one	a	year,	would	not	be	the	world's	best	automobile	manufacturer.	Or	suppose	Professor	C	used	to	publish	a	paper	every	six	months,	but	she	has	slowed	down,	while	D,	who	is	younger,	has	not.	That	is	an	ominous	sign	from	the	standpoint	of	granting	C	tenure,	because	a	tenured	professor	is	very	hard	to	fire	even	if	he	or	she	has	ceased	to	be	a	productive	scholar.	With	mandatory	retirement	now	unlawful,	the	grant	of	tenure	is	often	literally	a	lifetime	commitment	by	the	employing	institution,	barring	dementia	or	serious	misconduct.	Id.		Judge	Posner	also	pointed	out	that	both	obtaining	grants	in	some	fields	and	office	politics	adds	further	complications	to	examining	tenure	denials,	stating:		 In	 some	 academic	 fields,	 moreover—including	 as	 it	 happens	 physiology—research	 requires	 costly	 laboratories	 financed	 by	 grants	 from	 the	 federal	
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government	or	 from	foundations.	Proficiency	 in	obtaining	grants	 is	a	highly	valued	capability	 in	such	 fields;	and	scholars	differ	 in	 their	ability	 to	obtain	grants.	Then	too,	office	politics	frequently	plays	a	role	in	the	award	or	denial	of	 tenure;	 friendships	 and	 enmities,	 envy	 and	 rivalry—the	 stuff	 of	 such	academic	novels	as	Publish	and	Perish:	Three	Tales	of	Tenure	and	Terror,	 by	James	Hynes,	 or	Randall	 Jarrell's	Pictures	 from	an	Institution—can	 figure	 in	tenure	 recommendations	 by	 the	 candidate's	 colleagues,	 along	 with	disagreements	on	what	are	the	most	promising	areas	of	research.	In	addition,	many	 academics	 are	 hypersensitive	 to	 criticism,	 especially	 by	 younger	academics,	whom	 they	 suspect,	 often	 rightly,	 of	wanting	 to	 supplant	 them.	Although	office	politics	and	professional	jealousy	are	bad	reasons	for	denying	tenure,	an	erroneous	denial	of	tenure,	as	such,	does	not	violate	Title	VII.		Id.	at	816-17.			Judge	 Posner	 found	 an	 analogy	 in	 the	 decision	 to	 appoint	 a	 federal	 judge	 in	 tenure	decisions,	noting:		The	 decisionmaking	 process	 in	 an	 academic	 hierarchy	 creates	 further	 complication.	Granting	 tenure,	 like	 appointing	 a	 federal	 judge,	 is	 a	 big	 commitment.	 The	 final	 decision	may	 be	 made	 by	 a	 committee,	 or	 an	 official	 such	 as	 a	 university	 provost	 or	 president,	remote	 from	 the	 chairman	 and	 the	 other	members	 of	 a	 candidate's	 department.	 Even	 if	invidious	 considerations	 play	 a	 role	 in	 the	 department's	 recommendation	 for	 or	 against	tenure,	they	may	play	no	role	 in	the	actual	tenure	decision,	made	at	a	higher	 level.	 In	the	present	 case	 the	 tenure	 decision	 was	made	 by	 Northwestern's	 provost,	 and	 there	 is	 no	evidence	that	he	was	influenced	by	the	fact	that	Blasdel	is	a	woman.	So	she	can	prevail	only	by	 showing	 that	 the	 provost's	 decision	 was	 decisively	 influenced	 by	 someone	 who	was	prejudiced.	 Sun	 v.	 Board	 of	 Trustees	 of	 University	 of	 Illinois,	 473	 F.3d	 799,	 812–13	 (7th	Cir.2007);	Qamhiyah	v.	Iowa	State	University	of	Science	&	Technology,	566	F.3d	733,	745–46	(8th	 Cir.2009);	 cf.	 Schandelmeier–Bartels	 v.	 Chicago	Park	District,	 634	 F.3d	 372,	 378–79,	383–84	 (7th	 Cir.2011);	Adelman–Reyes	v.	 Saint	Xavier	University,	 500	 F.3d	 662,	 667	 (7th	Cir.2007).		Id.	at	817		Lastly,	 Judge	 Posner	 warned	 against	 using	 statistical	 inferences	 in	 tenure	 denial	 cases	because:		And	 finally,	because	 so	many	 factors	 influence	 the	 tenure	process	and	because	 statistical	inferences	 of	 discrimination	 are	 difficult	 to	 draw	when	 there	 is	 only	 a	 small	 number	 of	observations	 (tenure	 appointments	 in	 a	 particular	 department	 may	 be	 few	 and	 far	between),	it	can	be	difficult	to	infer	the	presence	of	an	invidious	influence	such	as	the	sex	of	the	candidate	merely	by	comparing	successful	and	unsuccessful	tenure	applicants.		Id.	
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Barron	v.	Univ.	of	Notre	Dame	Du	Lac,	93	F.	Supp.	3d	906,	908-10	(N.D.	Ind.	2015)		Plaintiff	 alleges	 that	 when	 she	was	 denied	 tenure	 in	May	 2009	 she	 suffered	 an	 adverse	employment	 action	 caused	 by	 invidious	 gender	 discrimination,	 and	 argued	 that	 she	 can	succeed	 under	 either	 the	 direct	 or	 indirect	 method	 of	 proof.	 Defendant	 asserted	 that	Plaintiff	 never	 suffered	 an	 adverse	 employment	 action	 because	 Defendant	 granted	 her	tenure	 after	 her	 successful	 internal	 university	 appeal.	 The	 court	 denied	 in	 part	 the	defendant’s	motion	for	summary	judgment.	Plaintiff	 is	 a	 woman	 who	 holds	 a	 Ph.D.	 in	 mathematics	 who	 was	 denied	 promotion	 to	Associate	Professor	and	tenure	in	2009.	The	Dean	of	the	College	of	Science	(which	includes	the	Math	Department),	sent	Plaintiff	a	written	explanation	of	the	negative	decision	stating	that	the	Provost's	Advisory	Committee	(“PAC”)	had	recommended	against	awarding	tenure	because	 the	 “quality	 of	 [Plaintiff's]	 teaching	 did	 not	 meet	 the	 standard	 of	 excellence	expected	 of	 [tenure	 candidates].”	Plaintiff	 pursued	 two,	 parallel,	 internal	 appeals	 of	 the	tenure	 denial.	 One	 avenue	 focused	 on	 whether	 the	 denial	 of	 tenure	 was	 substantially	affected	by	procedural	error,	personal	bias,	or	academic	freedom	issues.	The	Committee	on	Appeals	determined	that	there	was	not	enough	evidence	showing	that	the	decision	to	deny	tenure	 was	 affected	 by	 one	 of	 these	 subjective	 factors.	 The	 second	 route	 is	 called	 the	“Appendix	 A”	 appeals	 process	 and	 applies	 to	 reviewing	 adverse	 promotion	 or	 tenure	decisions	that	are	allegedly	the	product	of	sex	discrimination.			Plaintiff	conducted	an	independent	study	of	teaching	evaluations	in	the	Math	Department.	She	 discovered	 that	 among	 assistant	 professors,	 the	 female	 professors	 were	 assigned	introductory-level	 courses	 at	 a	 markedly	 higher	 percentage	 of	 their	 total	 number	 of	courses	 taught,	 as	 compared	 to	 the	male	professors.	 Plaintiff	 used	 this	 evidence	 to	 show	Defendant's	 perception	 of	 her	 teaching	 qualities	 was	 a	 result	 of	 gender	 discrimination.	Plaintiff	 had	 a	 history	 of	 receiving	 low	 TCE	 scores	 from	 students	 in	 introductory	 level	courses.	 She	 claimed	 that	 these	 lower	 evaluations	 resulted	 from	 the	 disproportional	assignment	 of	 introductory-level	 mathematics	 courses.	 Instructors	 in	 those	 courses	notoriously	 receive	 lower	 student	 evaluations	 because	 many	 of	 the	 students	 in	 those	classes	are	not	math	majors.	She	argued	that	the	disproportionate	assignment	of	these	low-level	courses	was	the	result	of	gender	bias,	and	therefore,	she	was	denied	tenure	because	of	her	sex.	Plaintiff	compiled	statistical	data	to	support	these	claims,	and	supplied	the	data	to	the	Committee	on	Advancement	and	Promotions.			Among	 the	 assistant	 professors	 in	 the	Math	 Department	 eligible	 for	 tenure,	 from	 1999–2009,	Defendant	granted	tenure	to	eight	males	and	one	female.	The	sole	female,	Professor	Polini	 taught	 six	 courses,	 and	 three	 of	 the	 males,	 Professors	 Hind,	 Misiolek,	 and	 Diller,	taught	 fifteen	 courses	 before	 tenure;	 Plaintiff	 taught	 sixteen	 courses.	However,	 eleven	 of	Plaintiff's	 sixteen	 courses	were	 100–level	 introductory	 courses,	while	Hind	 and	Misiolek	each	taught	five	100–level	courses,	and	Diller	taught	one	100–level	course.			Pursuant	 to	Appendix	A	of	 the	Defendant's	Academic	Articles,	 Plaintiff	 selected	a	 tenured	faculty	member	from	an	appointed	panel	to	review	her	case,	and	this	reviewer	decided	that	the	President's	decision	to	deny	tenure	should	be	remanded	to	the	PAC	to	be	reconsidered.	
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This	 remand	 began	 in	 January	 2010,	 but	 started	 in	 the	 Department	 of	 Mathematics	Committee	on	Advancement	and	Promotion	instead	of	the	PAC.			On	February	18,	2010,	Plaintiff	completed	an	EEOC	intake	questionnaire	and	indicated	that	she	wanted	to	initiate	a	charge	of	sex	discrimination	against	Defendant.	Plaintiff	submitted	a	 charge	 of	 sex	 discrimination	 and	 retaliation	 to	 the	 Indiana	Civil	 Rights	 Commission	 on	April	1,	2010.			The	2009–10	school	year	ended	in	May	2010.	On	June	9,	2010,	Provost	Thomas	Burish	sent	Plaintiff	a	 letter	 indicating	 that	her	Appendix	A	appeal	was	successful	and	President	Rev.	Jenkins	 offered	 Plaintiff	 promotion	 and	 tenure.	 Plaintiff	 accepted	 the	 offer	 for	 tenure	 on	June	14,	but	also	asked	for	a	grant	of	paid	leave	in	order	to	teach	at	Max	Planck	Institute	in	Germany.	 Defendant	 granted	 Plaintiff	 a	 year-long	 leave	 of	 absence,	 but	 the	 leave	 was	unpaid	 because	 she	 had	 not	 accumulated	 the	 Department	 of	 Mathematics	 minimum	 six	years	of	service	since	her	last	paid	leave.	She	returned	to	her	position	with	Defendant.			The	court	first	noted	that	the	reversal	of	the	tenure	denial	on	appeal	did	not	rise	to	a	level	of	direct	 evidence	of	 sex	discrimination.	 It	 then	proceeded	 to	analyze	 the	 case	under	 the	McDonald	 Douglas	 paradigm.	 Whether	 plaintiff	 demonstrated	 an	 adverse	 action	 was	 at	issue.	 The	 court	 ruled	 that	 the	 “initial	 denial	 of	 tenure	 in	 this	 case	 constitutes	 adverse	employment	 action,	 despite	 the	 subsequent	 grant	 of	 tenure,	 because	 the	 initial	 denial	caused	 Plaintiff	 to	 materially	 suffer.”	 Although	 she	 secured	 another	 position	 for	 the	following	 year	 while	 the	 internal	 appeals	 process	 began	 reconsidering	 her	 tenure	candidacy	in	January	2010,	she	was	granted	a	leave	of	absence	without	pay	that	she	would	not	have	requested	had	she	not	been	denied	tenure	 in	May	2009.	Plaintiff	sought,	among	other	 damages,	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 salary	 she	would	 have	made	 as	 an	 Associate	Professor	of	Mathematics	with	tenure	and	the	stipend	she	actually	received	from	the	Max	Planck	Institute	for	Mathematics	for	the	2010–11	school	year.	The	court	ruled	that	this	loss	of	earnings	is	more	than	de	minimis	and	constitutes	a	materially	adverse	effect	of	the	initial	denial.	Id.	at	914.		For	 the	 fourth	 prong	 of	 the	 McDonnell	 Douglas	 test,	 Plaintiff	 presented	 evidence	 that	similarly	 situated	 male	 professors	 were	 granted	 tenure	 where	 she	 was	 initially	 denied,	notably	 Professors	 Hind,	Misiolek,	 and	 Diller.	 Defendant	 did	 not	 dispute	 that	 these	men	received	 tenure,	 but	 argued	 that	 because	 another	 female,	 Professor	 Polini,	 also	 received	tenure	there	should	not	be	any	inference	of	gender	discrimination.	Defendant	also	asserted	that	Plaintiff	has	failed	to	demonstrate	that	the	men	who	were	promoted	are	appropriate	comparators.		The	court	noted	that	an	appropriate	comparator	is	a	“similarly	situated”	person	who	was	treated	more	favorably.	The	court	relied	on	Sun	v.	Bd.	of	Trs.	of	Univ.	of	Ill.,	473	F.3d	799,	814	 (7th	 Cir.2007)	 where	 the	 Seventh	 Circuit	 considered	 another	 tenure	 candidate	 as	“similarly	situated”	to	Sun	because	he	was	in	the	same	department	as	Sun,	he	was	outside	the	protected	class,	and	was	considered	for	tenure	the	year	before	Sun.	Therefore,	the	court	here	 found	 it	 appropriate	 to	 view	 several	 of	 the	men	 identified	 by	 Plaintiff	 as	 similarly	
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situated	to	her	if	they	had	the	same	rank	as	her	in	the	Math	Department	and	were	eligible	for	tenure	within	a	reasonable	time	of	her	initial	denial	in	May	2009.	The	court	 found	 that	at	 least	one	of	 the	male	professors	promoted	and	given	 tenure	was	comparable	 to	 Plaintiff.	 Professor	 Hind,	 in	 particular,	 satisfied	 these	 requirements.	Professor	Hind	was	 a	male,	Defendant	 gave	Professor	Hind	 tenure	 in	 2007,	 and	prior	 to	receiving	 tenure	 he	was	 an	 assistant	 professor	 in	 the	Math	 Department.	 Prof.	 Hind	was	more	 appropriate	 than	 some	other	males	 because	he	 taught	 almost	 the	 same	number	 of	courses	as	Plaintiff	before	the	tenure	decision.	Thus,	the	Court	was	satisfied	that	Professor	Hind	was	an	appropriate	comparator.		The	court	found	that	the	Plaintiff	carried	her	burden	of	demonstrating	the	prima	facie	case,	and	that	the	Defendant’s	met	its		legitimate,	non-discriminatory	reason	for	the	action,	that	the	 quality	 of	 her	 teaching	 “did	 not	meet	 the	 standard	 of	 excellence”	 expected	 of	 tenure	candidates.	 However,	 the	 court	 ruled	 that	 the	 evidence	 supporting	 Plaintiff's	prima	 facie	case	 also	 shows	 that	 Defendant's	 proffered	 non-discriminatory	 reason	 could	 have	 been	pretextual.	 Therefore,	 it	 found	 that	 a	 reasonable	 jury	 could	 conclude	 that	 sex	discrimination	was	a	motivating	 factor	 in	 the	decision	to	deny	Plaintiff	 tenure	because	of	the	 disproportionate	 number	 of	 introductory	 courses	 assigned	 to	 women	 in	 the	 Math	Department.	Id.	at	914-15.			Grant	v.	Cornell	University,	87	F.Supp.2d	153	(N.D.N.Y.	2000)		Plaintiff	Keith	Grant,	an	African	American	was	the	first	person	of	color	to	ever	be	hired	into	a	 tenure-track	 position	 within	 the	 Theater	 Arts	 Department	 of	 the	 College	 of	 Arts	 and	Sciences	at	Cornell	University.	 	Grant	was	hired	on	July	1,	1989	as	an	assistant	professor.		This	 decision	 to	 hire	 was	 approved	 by	 the	 Senior	 Faculty	 of	 the	 Department	 and	 the	Department	Chair.	 The	position	was	 for	 three	 years	 and	was	not	 tenured.	 	However,	 the	position	came	with	the	option	for	Cornell	to	renew	Grant’s	appointment	for	another	three	years.	 	Near	 the	end	of	his	second	 three-year	period,	Grant	was	 to	be	again	reviewed	 for	tenure	and	if	denied,	he	would	be	given	a	final	one-year	term	of	employment.	Near	the	end	of	 his	 first	 three-year	 term,	 Cornell	 decided	 to	 reappoint	 Grant	 for	 the	 second	 term.	 	 A	March	2,	1992	letter	from	the	Department	Chair	(Levitt)	reviewed	Grant’s	teaching,	artistic	work,	 service	 and	 collegiality.	 The	 letter	 contained	 many	 positive	 comments	 but	 also	contained	some	negative	comments.		This	letter	explicitly	laid	out	the	criteria	the	plaintiff	needed	to	achieve	to	qualify	for	tenure.		The	criteria	stated	in	the	letter	read:			 [I]n	three	years	time	you	will	be	held	to	a	standard	of	achieving	some	level	of	national	 	 recognition.	 	 This	 level	 of	 national	 recognition	 is	 a	 necessary	condition	 for	 all	 candidates	 to	 be	 promoted	 to	 Associate	 Professor	 with	indefinite	tenure.		It	is,	therefore,	incumbent	upon	you	to	immediately	choose	and	 develop	 an	 area	 of	 expertise:	 directing,	 acting,	 or	 teaching.	 	 In	 one	 of	these	 areas	 you	 must	 achieve	 significant	 credential	 in	 the	 next	 three	years…We	want	to	emphasize	at	this	juncture	that	a	national	reputation	is	a	necessary	condition	for	promotion.”	Cornell,	87	F.Supp.2d	at	156-157.	
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	To	 assist	 the	plaintiff	 in	 the	 tenure	process,	 the	 Senior	 Faculty	 assigned	Professor	David	Feldshuh	to	serve	as	his	mentor.	 	 In	 this	role,	Feldshuh	provided	advice	and	counsel	and	served	as	a	conduit	between	plaintiff	and	the	Senior	Faculty,	who	would	ultimately	vote	on	whether	to	recommend	plaintiff’s	tenure.		Feldshuh	served	as	plaintiff’s	mentor	from	1992-1995	where	he	met	with	plaintiff	and	provided	extensive	comments	and	evaluation.		In	one	such	 meeting	 in	 May	 1993,	 Feldshuh	 sent	 a	 letter	 afterwards	 “memorializing”	 the	comments	he	made	to	plaintiff.	In	this	letter,	plaintiff	was	criticized	for	grade	inflation,	poor	communication	 with	 students	 and	 faculty	 and	 poor	 artistic	 achievement.	 	 Feldshuh	believed	at	this	time	that	plaintiff	needed	significant	improvement	in	all	areas	required	for	tenure.		Id.	at	157.		Between	 1994-95,	 plaintiff’s	 problems	 continued	 and	 he	 received	 criticism	 in	 all	 areas,	which	 were	 being	 taken	 into	 account	 for	 tenure	 purposes.	 	 Though	 plaintiff	 received	accolades	from	some	individuals,	the	Senior	Faculty	gave	greater	weight	to	the	criticisms,	some	of	which	derived	from	their	own	personal	observations.		Id.		Near	the	end	of	his	second	term,	in	1995,	plaintiff	was	reviewed	again	from	tenure	and	as	a	result	 of	 plaintiff’s	 failure	 to	 achieve	 the	 required	 achievements,	 the	 Senior	 Faculty	unanimously	recommended	denial	of	tenure.		Seven	members	of	the	Senior	Faculty	voted:	five	were	the	same	members	who	had	initially	recommended	plaintiff’s	hiring	in	1989	and	his	reappointment	in	1992.		Plaintiff	appealed	this	decision	–	unsuccessfully.	Then	Plaintiff	appealed	to	Dean	of	the	College	of	Arts	and	Sciences,	who	convened	an	ad	hoc	committee	to	review	the	negative	recommendation	but	this	commission	ultimately	agreed	to	deny	tenure	after	 a	 thorough	 review	 of	 all	 of	 the	 evidence	 concluding	 that	 there	 was	 no	 compelling	evidence	 that	 the	Department	of	Theatre	Arts	 intentionally	acted	 in	bad	 faith	and	agreed	that	plaintiff	 failed	 to	meet	 the	 tenure	 requirements	 (i.e.	national	 recognition,	 and	 issues	with	students).		Id.		Plaintiff	 then	 appealed	 decision	 to	 the	 university	 appeals	 committee,	 comprised	 of	 five	faculty	members,	 none	 of	 whom	were	 related	 to	 plaintiff’s	 department.	 	 The	 committee	conducted	an	intensive	investigation	and	concluded	that	there	was	no	racial	discrimination	when	 the	 theatre	 department	 recommended	 to	 deny	 plaintiff	 tenure	 and	 that	 the	department	had	valid	reasons.				After	 another	 appeal,	 plaintiff	 ultimately	 chose	 to	 resign	 rather	 than	 serve	 out	 the	remainder	of	his	last	year	on	August	15,	1996.	Plaintiff	then	commenced	this	action	on	July	30,	1997.	Id.		The	court	commenced	its	analysis	of	the	claim	by	noting:		 The	Second	Circuit	has	noted	repeatedly	that	tenure	decisions	involve	unique	factors	 which	 set	 them	 apart	 from	 ordinary	 employment	 decisions,	 and	federal	courts	should	exercise	caution	in	reviewing	them.	See	Fisher	v.	Vassar	College,	70	F.3d	1420,	1434–35	(2d	Cir.1995),	reh'g	en	banc,	114	F.3d	1332	(2d	Cir.1997)		[Other	citations	omitted]	“Because	tenure	decisions	involve	a	
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myriad	 of	 considerations	 and	 are	 made	 by	 numerous	 individuals	 and	committees	over	a	lengthy	period	of	time,	a	plaintiff	‘faces	an	uphill	battle	in	[his]	 efforts	 to	 prove	 discrimination	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 race	 ...in	 the	 refusal	 to	grant	[him]	tenure.’	”	[citations	omitted].Thus,	while	tenure	decisions	are	not	immune	 from	 review,	 courts	 are	 cautious	 in	 second-guessing	 tenure	decisions,	 as	 the	 “court	 does	 not	 sit	 as	 a	 super	 tenure-review	 committee.”	[citation	omitted].	 Id.	at	157-58. 			Further,	the	court	ruled:	“In	order	to	show	that	he	was	qualified	for	tenure,	plaintiff	must	demonstrate	that	“[s]ome	significant	portion	of	the	departmental	faculty,	referents	or	other	scholars	 in	 the	 particular	 field	 hold	 a	 favorable	 view	 on	 the	 question.”	 Id.	 Moreover,		“[c]onsiderably	absent	from	the	record	is	any	proof	that	“some	significant	portion”	of	the	Department	 viewed	 plaintiff	 as	 qualified	 for	 tenure.	 	 It	 is	 undisputed	 that	 none	 of	 the	Departmental	 faculty	 believed	 plaintiff	 qualified	 for	 tenure;	 indeed,	 the	 faculty	unanimously	 voted	 to	 recommend	denial	 of	 plaintiff’s	 tenure,	 specifically	 finding	 that	 he	was	not	qualified.		On	reconsideration,	the	faculty	unanimously	voted	to	recommend	denial	of	tenure	for	a	second	time.”	Id.			The	 court	 also	 concluded	 that	 Grant	 came	 forward	 with	 “very	 little	 evidence”	 that	suggested	 that	 his	 tenure	 denial	 occurred	 under	 any	 circumstances	 that	 gave	 rise	 to	 an	inference	of	discrimination.		Id.	at	159.		The	evidence	that	plaintiff	supplied	to	the	court	to	prove	 an	 atmosphere	 of	 racial	 discrimination	 included:	 anecdotal	 stories	 about	 poor	treatment	 he	 received	within	 the	 Department,	 three	 unsworn	 letters	 from	 other	 African	Americans	 who	 anecdotally	 complained	 of	 racial	 tensions	 within	 the	 Department.	 Id.	 at	160.	The	court	ruled	that	this	insufficient	evidence	coupled	with	plaintiff’s	ability	to	in	fact	demonstrate	he	was	qualified	for	tenure	in	the	first	place	would	not	lead	a	reasonable	jury	to	find	that	he	was	denied	tenure	to	due	his	race.	Id.			
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